Philosophy books?

[kuehnepips]

Ah. Care to qualify your opinions?

I've been living in Germany for 37 years (actually near the house Hegel was born) and I've read him, Husserl, Heidegger, Freud, Wittgestein, Marx etc. etc. pp.

In German.

[Melville]

avoid Heidegger by all means.

:| That's the wrongest advice ever. No other philosopher has provided as precise and, in my view, correct a description of human experience as Heidegger did (or at least no philosopher before him did so).

[Qrazy]

I've been living in Germany for 37 years (actually near the house Hegel was born) and I've read him, Husserl, Heidegger, Freud, Wittgestein, Marx etc. etc. pp.

In German.

Good for you. Yet I'm not sure how your ability to read precludes your ability to communicate your thoughts.

In fact I'm not sure what your age, your proximity to Hegel's birthplace or your ability to speak German has to do with Husserl or Heidegger's philosophy in the slightest. We do not exist in an intellectual gerontocracy. And you certainly can't be saying that something must be read in it's mother tongue to be intelligible.

If you find Husserl and Heidegger underwhelming you must have some reason for this. What aspect of their philosophy do you find unappealing? I'm afraid arbitrary appeals to authority hold little sway with me.

[Izzy Black]

I don't know about that. Kant introduces his ideas well enough on his own, I think, and you can get the gist of Descartes' ideas just by reading an encyclopedia summary. Of course, Descartes is up there with Plato and Kant in terms of influence, but I found that reading his books didn't illuminate much except the lameness of his arguments. Sartre and Heidegger are at least as readable as Husserl, and they re-introduce and review phenomenology in their big books.

Kant isn't exactly famous for accessible introductions. In fact, he's one of the most inaccessible philosophers out there; ponderous, dry, repetitive, long-winded, arcane - and as made worse by necessity of the content - sufficiently abstract. I would not only recommend reading Descartes before reading Kant, but to be familiar with Hume and Leibniz as well. A basic understanding of the disputes between Empiricism and Rationalism is practically prerequisite for a relatively productive reading of the Critique. I would say, echoing Qrazy, Descartes especially.

Now, at the same rate, you can jump into any philosopher head on if you like, but in the case of Kant, if you want to really understand his views on metaphysics and epistemology, you should really be acquainted with a few folks, and as you say, secondary sources will probably suffice for many, but I would recommend some engagement with primary sources of Descartes prior to reading. (I would also agree with recommending Husserl before reading certain areas of Sartre.)

* I realize that you were not suggesting all or even any of this, but I figured it's worth mentioning (if it hasn't been already).

As to the thread, there is a strong bias here for Continental philosophy, which I suppose is understandable given that this is a film forum so it will naturally have literary-centric leanings. I would would personally echo mentions of Wittgenstein, Quine, Russell, Moore, and Kripke. I'd throw out Berkeley, Bacon, Dewey, Ardendt, Weil, and Ryle as well. I would also recommend some contemporary and late 20th philosophy such as McDowell, Putnam, Rorty, Sellars, and Strawson.

[Llopin]

Kant is one of the worst writers ever. Man had genuine ideas, but couldn't articulate them well.

Myself I'm pretty fond of later day Wittgenstein (the Philosophical Investigations), Nietzsche, Schopenhauer (the best) and Kierkegaard. And of course the postmodern bastards, as in Foucault (specially his introductions), Derrida (ultra-interesting and funny at times) and Deleuze.

Zizek is teh shit too. Besides his way of talking is hilarious, so everytime I read him I cannot help but picture him and chuckle.

[B-side]

I picked up The Communist Manifesto for 6 bucks and The Gay Science for 12. Excited to dive into them.

[Melville]

Kant isn't exactly famous for accessible introductions. In fact, he's one of the most inaccessible philosophers out there.

I think reports of his inaccessibility are greatly exaggerated. He is successfully taught in first-year philosophy courses, so he can't be all that impenetrable. Most 20th century continental philosophy that I've read is more difficult.

The Gay Science

Oh, that's the last major Nietzsche book I want to read. Let me know what you think of it.

[B-side]

Oh, that's the last major Nietzsche book I want to read. Let me know what you think of it.

I still gotta finish The Antichrist.:lol:

[

Show Spoiler

Depression has come back full force. I don't have the will to do much of anything, let alone something that requires patience.

]

[Melville]

I still gotta finish The Antichrist.:lol:

[

Show Spoiler

Depression has come back full force. I don't have the will to do much of anything, let alone something that requires patience.

]

[

Show Spoiler

To quote Nietzsche (in his early, Schopenhauerian days), "The very best of all things is completely beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best thing for you is—to meet an early death."

]

[B-side]

[

Show Spoiler

To quote Nietzsche (in his early, Schopenhauerian days), "The very best of all things is completely beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best thing for you is—to meet an early death."

]

I'm trying to decide if that's cheering me up or depressing me more.:P

[Melville]

I'm trying to decide if that's cheering me up or depressing me more.:P

A little from column A, a little from column B.

[B-side]

A little from column A, a little from column B.

As silly as it may seem, I've come to not expect to make it too far, especially if I keep going at my current rate. Viva el gordo!:frustrated:

[Melville]

As silly as it may seem, I've come to not expect to make it too far, especially if I keep going at my current rate. Viva el gordo!:frustrated:

What is Viva el gordo? I tried to google it, but that only led to confusion.

Much as I'd like to continue this joyous conversation about how life is hopeless, fruitless, and causes great pains in my chest, I have to get out of the house because the jackhammering outside my window is driving me insane.

Best of luck with keeping on keeping on.

[B-side]

What is Viva el gordo? I tried to google it, but that only led to confusion.

Much as I'd like to continue this joyous conversation about how life is hopeless, fruitless, and causes great pains in my chest, I have to get out of the house because the jackhammering outside my window is driving me insane.

Best of luck with keeping on keeping on.

Like Viva Las Vegas, but Viva Fat instead.:P

[Melville]

Like Viva Las Vegas, but Viva Fat instead.:P

Oh. You didn't look that fat in your picture.

[B-side]

Oh. You didn't look that fat in your picture.

Appearances can be deceiving?

[Melville]

Appearances can be deceiving?

So it's your personality that's really fat? Sounds jolly. You should adopt a jolly demeanor. Everybody loves jolly. Although it's really only appealing in old men. So your aim should be to survive long enough to get old, and then become jolly. It'll all be worth it.

[B-side]

So it's your personality that's really fat? Sounds jolly. You should adopt a jolly demeanor. Everybody loves jolly. Although it's really only appealing in old men. So your aim should be to survive long enough to get old, and then become jolly. It'll all be worth it.

I'll do my best.:P

[lovejuice]

the first quarter of phenomenology of spirit ends with a big bang for me, when hegel discusses the dialectic movement between individuality and the unchangeable. it bares a lot of similarities to buddhism too. in fact, in the art of happiness, his holiness the dalai lama says something along this line.

[Melville]

the first quarter of phenomenology of spirit ends with a big bang for me, when hegel discusses the dialectic movement between individuality and the unchangeable. it bares a lot of similarities to buddhism too. in fact, in the art of happiness, his holiness the dalai lama says something along this line.

Forgive my poor memory, but which section is that? I felt like the book peaked in section B. IV. The Truth of Self-Certainty, especially in the description of the master-slave dialectic. Everything up to and including that is pure genius, really astoundingly brilliant (though his description of the Here and Now at the foundation of all the movements might be thought of too much as a presumed origin, whereas it should be a trace in the sense of Derrida). Beyond that point, though, I felt like the movements, and in particular the reconciliations between thesis and antithesis, became more and more questionable. And of course, he states his movements as "logical" certainties, based on his own tenuous logic. I love Kierkegaard's attack on Hegelian logic in the preface to Concept of Anxiety.

[lovejuice]

I felt like the book peaked in section B. IV. The Truth of Self-Certainty, especially in the description of the master-slave dialectic. Everything up to and including that is pure genius, really astoundingly brilliant

That's where I am. My favorite part is the next subsection when he discusses stoicism and scepticism before moving on to how individuality compromises with the spirit.

(though his description of the Here and Now at the foundation of all the movements might be thought of too much as a presumed origin, whereas it should be a trace in the sense of Derrida).

That part is a bit questionable to me too. (Eco discusses a similar concept in A Theory of Semiotics.) Hegel, I feel, takes the semiotic argument a bit too far. Only because language is unable to express the particular, he assumes our mind works in the same way. Later linguisticians like Chomsky and Pinkus perhaps will have a lot to say about this.

I don't fully accept it, but I understand it enough to take it for granted. I'm glad I do -- and can do -- so since what follow is brilliant.

Beyond that point, though, I felt like the movements, and in particular the reconciliations between thesis and antithesis, became more and more questionable.

That's not promising, :sad:, although it's the part I am most waiting for. Is that where he lays the groundwork for later marxist theory?

[lovejuice]

And while we are on this topic of philosophy, last week I read and review The Birth of Tragedy. That is one tough book to review. It seems to say a lot of things which contradicts what Nietzsche later believes in. (In fact Aye Rand uses TBoT as to demonstrate how un-nietzschean Nietzsche is.)

[Melville]

That part is a bit questionable to me too. (Eco discusses a similar concept in A Theory of Semiotics.) Hegel, I feel, takes the semiotic argument a bit too far. Only because language is unable to express the particular, he assumes our mind works in the same way. Later linguisticians like Chomsky and Pinkus perhaps will have a lot to say about this.

I think we might have opposing criticisms here. Hegel presents the Here and Now as something underlying, an origin, that is disrupted and then overcome in a dialectical movement. But I think that's incorrect. Historically (i.e. as we grow from infancy) that might be true, but existentially it is not: I don't think, in situ, we do have access to the particular. The Here and Now is given to us already within our conceptual framework, sense of Self, memory, intentions, valuations, relations, etc. As such, it is not an origin. It is not "overcome" by a movement invoked by the other elements of our consciousness; instead, we are given it in terms of those other elements and movements. But we are perpetually aware of it as a limit, as something that would be there if we strip something else away. Hence, it is a trace, a (mis)perceived metaphysical origin that lingers in our experience of the world.

However, I think his description is valid if we begin from certain moments. In uncanny moments, we do become suddenly, crystallinely aware of the Here and Now. That is not a "return" to an origin (to Eden, to what is "prior" to the eating of the apple of knowledge). Instead, it is just etching over the trace. But from there, I think the movement he describes, the rupturing of the particular, does proceed.

Part of the issue here is how to interpret Hegel's dialectic: temporally or metaphorically. Do the dialectical movements occur in time? I feel like he leaves this point vague, though presumably he thinks these are universal structures that occur both temporally and atemporally.

That's not promising, :sad:, although it's the part I am most waiting for. Is that where he lays the groundwork for later marxist theory?

I'm guessing the most relevant stuff for Marxist theory would be in the second half of the book, where it talks about culture and history (though Philosophy of History might be still more relevant). However, Marx's materialist dialectic criticized Hegel's entire Idealist project, so the whole thing kind of lays the groundwork.

And while we are on this topic of philosophy, last week I read and review The Birth of Tragedy. That is one tough book to review. It seems to say a lot of things which contradicts what Nietzsche later believes in. (In fact Aye Rand uses TBoT as to demonstrate how un-nietzschean Nietzsche is.)

Yeah, it's very unlike his later stuff, though he continued to make use of the Apollonian-Dionysian concept. But I don't think it makes him un-Nietzschean; he just changed his mind. All his later stuff is internally consistent.

[lovejuice]

Hegel presents the Here and Now as something underlying, an origin, that is disrupted and then overcome in a dialectical movement. But I think that's incorrect....I don't think, in situ, we do have access to the particular. The Here and Now is given to us already within our conceptual framework, sense of Self, memory, intentions, valuations, relations, etc.

But if they're given to us already, they are not immediate, aren't they? Shouldn't Here and Now spring from the perception? That we aware of them more in uncanny moments is perhaps because the perception doesn't quite fit in with our pre-concept of reality. Thus the movement from the particular to the universal takes more effort. (Indeed we are back to the issue that you have raised. Is the movement temporal or atemporal?)

[Melville]

But if they're given to us already, they are not immediate, aren't they? Shouldn't Here and Now spring from the perception? That we aware of them more in uncanny moments is perhaps because the perception doesn't quite fit in with our pre-concept of reality. Thus the movement from the particular to the universal takes more effort. (Indeed we are back to the issue that you have raised. Is the movement temporal or atemporal?)

Here and Now spring from perception, but when we perceive, we are already in a state of mind; the perception appears in consciousness already within the context of our concepts, sense of Self and Otherness, etc. The uncanny ruptures the cohesion of this context, but that does indeed bring us back to whether the movement is temporal or atemporal. Do we perceive something, try to fit it within our expectations of reality, and fail, or is the uncanny thing given to us within those expectations, leading to a manifold of perception containing within itself an incongruity?