On Form, Structure and Theory

[Qrazy]

In my on going quest to develop a greater sense of all things cinema, I thought I'd begin a thread where we can discuss the formal elements of films in greater detail. For instance, innovative techniques that we either read about or view in a film for the first time; these may range from a type of shot, an intriguing use of color, light or shadow, an editing technique, a style of acting or non-acting, the general structure or lack of structure of the film or scene, sound design, etc and so forth. Feel free to discuss whatever formal discoveries you wish to and in relation to whatever thematic, symbolic, metaphoric, etc structures you wish to, but links to scholarly essays and other similar discussions are also greatly appreciated.

Of course I recognize that form isn't all that meaningful when it's divorced from it's content so feel free to also discuss and post links to general philosophies of cinema, the visual arts, cinematic history, etc.

And above all don't worry about saying something you think may sound silly, or posting a controversial idea, etc. the purpose here is simply to explore different thoughts and theories concerning form, structure and film theory. One thing, let's try as much as possible to stay away from value judgments concerning the films and art used as examples throughout our conversations. Discussions of personal preference certainly have their place and I love to discuss the films I like and dislike, but that is not the purpose of this thread.

I also just want to stress once more that while original thoughts and opinions are certainly welcome, try to post as many links to scholarly articles and discussions of film theory as possible. If you read something you find intriguing, post it! Even if it's a film review, just highlight the theoretical element of the review that you found particularly intriguing.

[Qrazy]

To start us off... Here's a film journal that has been a major influence on film theory from the 60's and onward.

http://www.screen.arts.gla.ac.uk/

[Dillard]

Harry Tuttle asks the question "When do images turn into cinema?" at his blog SCREENVILLE (http://screenville.blogspot.com/2007/10/when-do-images-turn-into-cinema.html).

[Qrazy]

Thanks for posting Dillard. As far as the article goes, although I appreciate what Tuttle is trying to do, I don't find his approach particularly psychologically/philosophically rigorous. In his attempt at establishing succinct cinematic definitions he constantly oversteps Hume's is-ought boundary, and doesn't really provide sufficient justification for why cinema should be what he's defining it to be. His observations on human perceptual processes which form the basis for our apprehension of cinema also leaves much to be desired.

However, the questions he raises are quite relevant to a recent thread we had on the old Matchcut about the Godard quote. And these questions are always worthy of a discussion. Again, thanks for posting.

As counterpoint to some of Tuttle's a priori assumptions on what constitutes proper cinema... here's an interesting article about Brakhage's work viewed from a phenomenological angle.

http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/07/44/brakhage-merleau-ponty.html

[Dillard]

If you disagree with Tuttle, I'd suggest you comment on his blog. I'm sure you'll find that he's up to the task with responding to your concerns.

As is par for the course with blogs, I think the post is meant as a discussion starter and not as a scholarly endeavor.

[Ivan Drago]

Great idea for a thread, Qrazy! I'll join you on your quest, as I too, am needing to develop a better sense of all things cinema.

[Melville]

As counterpoint to some of Tuttle's a priori assumptions on what constitutes proper cinema... here's an interesting article about Brakhage's work viewed from a phenomenological angle.

http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/07/44/brakhage-merleau-ponty.html
That's an interesting article, but I largely disagree with the author, particularly with his emphasis on the "essence" of phenomena. Assigning essences, hypothesizing a pre-predicative world, seems like a misguided attempt to find an "origin"; it seems like a metaphysical description at odds with the whole goal of phenomenology. (Unfortunately, I haven't read more than the first few pages of Phenomenology of Perception, but I'm hoping that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is a lot more nuanced than that.)

I think the author is right in saying that The Act of Seeing examines the human body from the perspective of an active engagement with the world, rather than assuming a fictitious "objective" standpoint (e.g. by using a fixed camera angle shot from above), but I don't think this means that the bodies are viewed as human beings. Certainly the humanity of the intact bodies is emphasized, but the way the camera then focuses on specific features of the mutilated bodies, such as glimmering pools of blood, abstracts away from our notions of human beings, forcing us to view the flesh as an aesthetic object. If anything, the film emphasizes that the bodies have no "innate meaning"—that their meaning is entirely contextual.

[Qrazy]

Informative article - Post Neo-Realist Italian Filmmakers: http://www.filmreference.com/encyclopedia/Independent-Film-Road-Movies/Italy-THE-SECOND-WAVE-A-NEW-POST-NEOREALIST-GENERATION-OF-AUTEURS.html


And from my limited experience with I've found filmreference.com to be a great site.

[balmakboor]

I find myself with some gift money to spend at amazon and I'm considering spending some of it on a good introductory book on film theories. But which one... Some I'm looking at are:

Film Theory: An Introduction by Robert Lapsley

Signs and Meaning in the Cinema by Peter Wollen

The Major Film Theories: An Introduction by J.D. Andrew

Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings by Leo Braudy

Any suggestions? I'm talking about something that will help me finally understand things like semiotics and psychoanalytic theory as it applies to cinema. Theories of the spectator. Auteur theory. Feminist film theory. Something called "suture theory" that I once heard somebody toss about on a discussion board. That sort of thing.

[Dillard]

The three books you list sans Wollen are going to be surveys with interpretation added by the editors/authors. If you want to get into the meat of some major theories, go back and read the source texts. As far as Bazin goes, all you get are compilations (like the What is Cinema? volumes). Read some Burch, like Life to Those Shadows, which examines the Institutional Mode of Representation (IMR) that developed in early cinema, and which is a response to Bazin's idealistic view of cinema (in that it involves ideological critique). Pick up Siegfried Kracauer's seminal Theory of Film. Christian Metz is your man for semiotics. Read Film Language: A Semiotics of Cinema. Read some Deleuze. He's a hot reference on the best film blogs these days. If the more philosophical side of film theory isn't your bag, best read some Bordwell. He seems to have a more systematic approach to film theory, almost moreso than anyone I've read, and he's your man for analyzing film aesthetics, and film history, really.

Don't shy away from filmmaker's writings either (IE: Jean Epstein, Sergei Eisenstein, the nouveau vague directors, etc.). For instance, check out some suggestions from Girish at GreenCine Daily (http://daily.greencine.com/archives/002220.html).

My favorite film book of late is Christian Keathley's Cinephilia and History: The Wind in the Trees, which presents the idea of the cinephiliac moment, and, very basically, has a lot of great research done on cinephilia and spectatorship (resources, resources, resources). Very engaging read too.

[balmakboor]

The three books you list sans Wollen are going to be surveys with interpretation added by the editors/authors. If you want to get into the meat of some major theories, go back and read the source texts. As far as Bazin goes, all you get are compilations (like the What is Cinema? volumes). Read some Burch, like Life to Those Shadows, which examines the Institutional Mode of Representation (IMR) that developed in early cinema, and which is a response to Bazin's idealistic view of cinema (in that it involves ideological critique). Pick up Siegfried Kracauer's seminal Theory of Film. Christian Metz is your man for semiotics. Read Film Language: A Semiotics of Cinema. Read some Deleuze. He's a hot reference on the best film blogs these days. If the more philosophical side of film theory isn't your bag, best read some Bordwell. He seems to have a more systematic approach to film theory, almost moreso than anyone I've read, and he's your man for analyzing film aesthetics, and film history, really.

Don't shy away from filmmaker's writings either (IE: Jean Epstein, Sergei Eisenstein, the nouveau vague directors, etc.). For instance, check out some suggestions from Girish at GreenCine Daily (http://daily.greencine.com/archives/002220.html).

My favorite film book of late is Christian Keathley's Cinephilia and History: The Wind in the Trees, which presents the idea of the cinephiliac moment, and, very basically, has a lot of great research done on cinephilia and spectatorship (resources, resources, resources). Very engaging read too.

Thanks. That Cinephilia and History book sounds interesting. My question all started yesterday. I was at the library and had Metz's book The Imaginary Signifier in my hands. I read a few pages and thought "This sounds interesting, but I'm not ready for it yet. There will be too many WTF moments per page." I'd like to do a little background reading if possible before giving it a try, kinda like reading the Primer of Freudian Psychology before attempting The Interpretation of Dreams.

[Qrazy]

Thanks. That Cinephilia and History book sounds interesting. My question all started yesterday. I was at the library and had Metz's book The Imaginary Signifier in my hands. I read a few pages and thought "This sounds interesting, but I'm not ready for it yet. There will be too many WTF moments per page." I'd like to do a little background reading if possible before giving it a try, kinda like reading the Primer of Freudian Psychology before attempting The Interpretation of Dreams.

As an aside, if you're going to read Freud and Jung I suggest doing so more form a historical than an intellectual perspective. While innovative and interesting, so much of their work is incredibly outdated and of little actual psychological value.

I get really frustrated when I read essays by lit. students interpreting a work in relation to in depth Freudian theory because it's so utterly useless. Very little insight is gained by comparing and contrasting a piece of literature to unfalsifiable psychology. It's like sure I can change the shape of this putty square to fit into this textual circle, but the square doesn't really fit the circle, I just make it fit it. And the plasticity of the square means that now there's a left over cylinder somewhere in my conceptual puzzle-kit that's not even being used.

I'm just ranting, not meant to be taken in relation to your comment really.

[Melville]

As an aside, if you're going to read Freud and Jung I suggest doing so more form a historical than an intellectual perspective. While innovative and interesting, so much of their work is incredibly outdated and of little actual psychological value.
The best thing about Freud was his explanation of how his patient's nightmares fit into the Freudian theory of dreams-as-wish-fulfillment: the nightmares were an expression of the patient's wish to frustrate Freud's analysis! That's gold... solid gold.

[Izzy Black]

Thanks for posting Dillard. As far as the article goes, although I appreciate what Tuttle is trying to do, I don't find his approach particularly psychologically/philosophically rigorous. In his attempt at establishing succinct cinematic definitions he constantly oversteps Hume's is-ought boundary, and doesn't really provide sufficient justification for why cinema should be what he's defining it to be. His observations on human perceptual processes which form the basis for our apprehension of cinema also leaves much to be desired.


I have not read the article, but these a priori assumptions about cinema and essence constitute a great deal of academic criticism. I am typically most influenced by the structuralist school of criticism - yet, at the same time, some of the most challenging, enlightening, thorough, and insightful pieces of criticism I have read have been of this type of criticism. For example, Charles R. Warner examines in this article (http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/06/39/hou_optics_ephemerality.html) the ontological notions of pure film in the work of Hou Hsiao-hsien, but namely in his recent opus Three Times. He does not necessarily subscribe to the theory himself (thus, ultimately putting forth a mostly structuralist analysis), but he examines how Hou's cinema invokes the modernist purism theories of Bazin, and shows how this ontology is represented by contrasting the dying age of film with the rise of a more postmodern, uncertain age or medium of digital cinema. It is fascinating to explore Hou's cinema through this lens, and I often find myself sympathetic to certain Bazinian ideas toward this prospect of an ontological cinema (which, even Deleuze, despite his primarily postmodern philosophy, seemed to invoke as well).


That's an interesting article, but I largely disagree with the author, particularly with his emphasis on the "essence" of phenomena. Assigning essences, hypothesizing a pre-predicative world, seems like a misguided attempt to find an "origin"; it seems like a metaphysical description at odds with the whole goal of phenomenology. (Unfortunately, I haven't read more than the first few pages of Phenomenology of Perception, but I'm hoping that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is a lot more nuanced than that.)

I do not think phenomenology necessarily discounts the possibility of a traceable truth or knowable origin of experience and reality. It should be noted that just because the author does not consider the use of the camera from an "objective" standpoint, this does not mean that origins of truth are untraceable or necessarily even ontological in nature, but rather can be found intersubjectively: "We can thus be justified in asserting that The Act of Seeing With One’s Own Eyes is, at heart, a film about intersubjectivity." It is true every individual is a perspective on the world. I think most modern philosophy concedes to this level of phenomenological epistemology, but only to an extent. Kant and post-Kantian thought made most of possible. Kant's "Copernicus Revolution", if you will, was conceiving of a world where every individual necessarily views the world through a subjective lens, like bifocals, metaphorically speaking. Thus, our view of the world is not noumenal (things-in-themselves) but phenomenal (things as we perceive them); Kant rejected the material idealistic notion that we could make definite statements that a priori objects exist in the world by merely perceiving them, yet, he did argue we could make a priori statements about knowing we ourselves exist, and thus, things therefore must exist because the self is noumenal, and to be self-aware is to have knowledge a priori.

Thus, while it is true no object has innate meaning as a positivist would argue, Kant, and subsequently Wittgenstein (and Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty), point out that meaning is contextual, just as you say, but this is not regressing toward a supreme relativism. Instead, he offers a notion of intersubjectivity (which, similarly, Kant's Categorical Imperative prescribes), where the noumenal a priori self will create meanings in relationship to others, and so this notion of the noumenal self converging with an intersubjective world is what creates the possibility of an a priori understanding of essential aesthetics (Bazinian cinema), science, and morality.


I think the author is right in saying that The Act of Seeing examines the human body from the perspective of an active engagement with the world, rather than assuming a fictitious "objective" standpoint (e.g. by using a fixed camera angle shot from above), but I don't think this means that the bodies are viewed as human beings. Certainly the humanity of the intact bodies is emphasized, but the way the camera then focuses on specific features of the mutilated bodies, such as glimmering pools of blood, abstracts away from our notions of human beings, forcing us to view the flesh as an aesthetic object. If anything, the film emphasizes that the bodies have no "innate meaning"—that their meaning is entirely contextual.

It is true their meaning is contextual, but this does not change our interdependent conception of the blood and body parts in relationship to bodies in-tact. It can never been completely divorced from the collective consciousness, despite Brakhage's bold philosophical intentions. The author is not discounting the contextual relationship of the image emphasized by its relationship to other images by means of matchcuting, juxtaposition, shot composition, or intercutting -- he realizes these images take on new meanings, but they still maintain their substantiative or significant origins, or as the author writes:


However, despite Brakhage’s intent, it cannot be said that these two films entirely escape Merleau-Ponty’s critique, for they are ultimately still subject to the fundamental limitations of which he speaks. Brakhage himself recognizes these limitations and, even though he cannot completely overcome them, he presents us with films that strive to possess something like a horizon.

It could be implied for his argument that whether the body has an innate meaning or not becomes de facto necessary in the broader context of intersubjective phenomenology (insofar as individuals themselves are meaningful in the noumenal sense).

[Izzy Black]

It has become popular and trendy to mock or write-off Freud these days. It has been the case for the past decade now, this is why I am surprised to still see such pervasive criticism of his work, as though it were something new, or as if his supporters were not aware of the modern reaction to post-Freudian psychology. He is mostly a philosopher at this point, much less a psychologist. Aristotle and Plato's psychology is outdated as well (and even Kant's for that matter), but they still have philosophical worth in terms of epistemology. I wrote a paper once on Freud, and while I systematically debunked most of his dream wish-fulfillment theories based on recent research in REM sleep and cognitive sleep neuroscience, there is still some interesting value in some of his theories. Formorest, dreams are still experiences driven by the unconscious reality (and it is important to remember Freud for revealing notions of an unconscious mind), and thus can be indicative of latent wishes or even emotions stimulated by experiences that we might not have in everyday life (near-death experiences and so on). Additionally, in terms of nightmares, modern research has shown that awareness of physiological disorders such as heart-disease can manifest in recurring dreams of horrible deaths (due to biological cues from the body -- such as temperature, heart rate, and blood pressure, indicating a possible relation to stress related illnesses). This has been supported by modern research in REM sleep. Thus, while it is popular to write-off Freud these days by obsessing over his controversial sexual-ego theories, his broader work and thought still remains a model by which subsequent philosophy and science continues to consider with valuable interest.

[Qrazy]

The best thing about Freud was his explanation of how his patient's nightmares fit into the Freudian theory of dreams-as-wish-fulfillment: the nightmares were an expression of the patient's wish to frustrate Freud's analysis! That's gold... solid gold.

Hehe, or the bit in dreams as wish fulfillment where he gets the guy he's analyzing to free associate his dream about thirty degrees removed from anything within the actual dream before finding the source of the man's neurosis... guess what... it had to do with a woman! Dun. dun. dun.

[Qrazy]

It has become popular and trendy to mock or write-off Freud these days. It has been the case for the past decade now, this is why I am surprised to still see such pervasive criticism of his work, as though it were something new, or as if his supporters were not aware of the modern reaction to post-Freudian psychology. He is mostly a philosopher at this point, much less a psychologist. Aristotle and Plato's psychology is outdated as well (and even Kant's for that matter), but they still have philosophical worth in terms of epistemology. I wrote a paper once on Freud, and while I systematically debunked most of his dream wish-fulfillment theories based on recent research in REM sleep and cognitive sleep neuroscience, there is still some interesting value in some of his theories. Formorest, dreams are still experiences driven by the unconscious reality (and it is important to remember Freud for revealing notions of an unconscious mind), and thus can be indicative of latent wishes or even emotions stimulated by experiences that we might not have in everyday life (near-death experiences and so on). Additionally, in terms of nightmares, modern research has shown that awareness of physiological disorders such as heart-disease can manifest in recurring dreams of horrible deaths (due to biological cues from the body -- such as temperature, heart rate, and blood pressure, indicating a possible relation to stress related illnesses). This has been supported by modern research in REM sleep. Thus, while it is popular to write-off Freud these days by obsessing over his controversial sexual-ego theories, his broader work and thought still remains a model by which subsequent philosophy and science continues to consider with valuable interest.

A lot of people who are new to the field still think of Freud as the authority figure for psychology and only know of and view psychology in relation to absurd literary applications and other mistaken pop psychology. They then dismiss the field on this basis, which is not anyone's fault, it just means that people interested in the field need to strive outright to correct misconceptions concerning what present day psychology is really all about. Even viewed as a philosopher a lot of Freud's theories lack rational rigorousness. He's particularly fond of unfalsifiable ideas and circular logic. I completely agree that his ideas are still important both historically and for present day inquiry, but adopting his overarching conception of psychology is problematic.

[Izzy Black]

A lot of people who are new to the field still think of Freud as the authority figure for psychology and only know of and view psychology in relation to absurd literary applications and other mistaken pop psychology. They then dismiss the field on this basis, which is not anyone's fault, it just means that people interested in the field need to strive outright to correct misconceptions concerning what present day psychology is really all about. Even viewed as a philosopher a lot of Freud's theories lack rational rigorousness. He's particularly fond of unfalsifiable ideas and circular logic. I completely agree that his ideas are still important both historically and for present day inquiry, but adopting his overarching conception of psychology is problematic.

I see. I suppose I do not encounter many students at the undergraduate level in that field to make an informed opinion either way, but I understand this sentiment be it the case.

[Izzy Black]

If the more philosophical side of film theory isn't your bag, best read some Bordwell. He seems to have a more systematic approach to film theory, almost moreso than anyone I've read, and he's your man for analyzing film aesthetics, and film history, really.


Indeed. Bordwell is the benchmark for a rigorous analytic approach to film criticism, which is based more on technical reasoning and universal epistemological postulates, devoid of the metacriticism and various philosophical points of view many critics argue from today. If you want to know about a technical cinema, Bordwell is the way to go. I need my balance of Bordwell as much as I need my Deleuze or middle-weights like Martin.

[Melville]

I do not think phenomenology necessarily discounts the possibility of a traceable truth or knowable origin of experience and reality. It should be noted that just because the author does not consider the use of the camera from an "objective" standpoint, this does not mean that origins of truth are untraceable or necessarily even ontological in nature, but rather can be found intersubjectively: "We can thus be justified in asserting that The Act of Seeing With One’s Own Eyes is, at heart, a film about intersubjectivity." It is true every individual is a perspective on the world. I think most modern philosophy concedes to this level of phenomenological epistemology, but only to an extent. Kant and post-Kantian thought made most of possible. Kant's "Copernicus Revolution", if you will, was conceiving of a world where every individual necessarily views the world through a subjective lens, like bifocals, metaphorically speaking. Thus, our view of the world is not noumenal (things-in-themselves) but phenomenal (things as we perceive them); Kant rejected the material idealistic notion that we could make definite statements that a priori objects exist in the world by merely perceiving them, yet, he did argue we could make a priori statements about knowing we ourselves exist, and thus, things therefore must exist because the self is noumenal, and to be self-aware is to have knowledge a priori.

Thus, while it is true no object has innate meaning as a positivist would argue, Kant, and subsequently Wittgenstein (and Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty), point out that meaning is contextual, just as you say, but this is not regressing toward a supreme relativism. Instead, he offers a notion of intersubjectivity (which, similarly, Kant's Categorical Imperative prescribes), where the noumenal a priori self will create meanings in relationship to others, and so this notion of the noumenal self converging with an intersubjective world is what creates the possibility of an a priori understanding of essential aesthetics (Bazinian cinema), science, and morality.
I don't think that Kant's revolutionary idea was that the world is viewed through a subjective lens, but that the subjective lens has the same defining characteristics for all people, and hence that the debate between idealism and realism was missing the point—which is that even if the world is transcendentally ideal, it is objectively real (i.e. it has the same defining characteristics for all people). This, I think, is what you are getting at as well, but your wording is a bit misleading, since this was the starting point for Kant's entire critical project. In any case, this only leads to objectively knowable experience, not to the origin or essence of said experience (unless you define objective characteristics to be the essence of experience, which would then have nothing to do with what I was talking about). And this objective knowledge would lead to a description of post-predicative experience, not pre-predicative experience, since it would only extract the content that all subjects would experience. Such a description is certainly where science and morality (particularly Kantian morality) lie.

This isn't to say that phenomenologists haven't tried to describe the essence of phenomena. I'm pretty sure that Husserl's phenomenology revolved around this (though I haven't read anything by him, so I might be way off). And latter-day (post-Being and Time) Heidegger seemed to veer in that direction. However, I think it's a bad idea: I agree with Sartre that predicative experience is merely one mode of experiencing the world; it does not mask the "essence" of the phenomena, because the phenomena is realized in terms of it. Using Heidegger's terminology, I'd say that the predicative and pre-predicative experience are co-primeval: one is not metaphysically "prior" to the other, nor can they be disentangled from each other (at least once we have reached a modicum of intellectual maturity). More colloquially, it's the problem of the chicken and the egg. We think of our experience in predicative terms, and although we might occasionally have a "pre"-predicative experience (e.g. a spiritual experience, a "moment of clarity", etc.), that in no way suggests that one experience is closer to extracting the essence of the phenomena than the other. Experience is what it is. There is nothing "behind" experience, no true or false modes of experience.

However, the "essence" of things, in one form or another, does seem like a factually necessary conceptual underpinning of our experience: as Sartre said, our actions are always performed in terms of some ideal, unambiguous world and self. But it has meaning only as an impetus, as a ground for our self-consciousness. The ideal is not realizable, nor does it have meaning outside of our conception of it. I'd classify the idea of "pure" experience, the essence of experience, as such an ideal. (It is, as Derrida says, not an origin but a trace.) Thus, when Alex Cobb (the author of the Brakhage essay in question) says that Brakhage's Black Ice aims at "the extraction and expression of the essence of these emotional experiences," I think that he is misrepresenting the meaning of such an aim. I don't know about anybody else, but when I watch something like Black Ice, it really bears little resemblance to any experience I can imagine. An actual experience is made meaningful by its surroundings, by notions of its place relative to what came before and what might come after, as well as by notions of what others think of it and of its physical situation. Black Ice, on the other hand, does not present the experience as experienced, but rather Brakhage's idealized pure notion of that experience as abstracted from the contextual surroundings that, in actual experience, give that experience its meaning. Yes, that's one brutally tortured sentence, but I think you'll follow me. Cobb goes on to say of cinema that

There is no horizon, or larger context, of which the images we see are a part; there is only the image on the screen – an image that is, in effect, cordoned off from the world by the filmmaker. Films such as Black Ice and Rage Net desperately attempt to transcend this fundamental limitation of the medium.
But the exact opposite is true: by attempting to present "pure," pre-predicative experience, Brakhage is explicitly ignoring the larger context of his experience and hence embracing the limitation of the medium. (Frankly, I'm not sure that these limitations really exist, but that's another issue.)


It is true their meaning is contextual, but this does not change our interdependent conception of the blood and body parts in relationship to bodies in-tact. It can never been completely divorced from the collective consciousness, despite Brakhage's bold philosophical intentions.
It's certainly true that presenting us first with the intact bodies has a huge impact. Since we are already aware of the bodies' meaning as human bodies, their post-mutilation, purely aesthetic meaning necessarily includes their prior meaning as part of its foundation. Indeed, the fact that the new meaning is filmed specifically as a breakdown of an old meaning requires that the old meaning remains implicit in the new. Nevertheless, when Cobb says that "Brakhage wants us to see the lifeless masses not merely as res extensa (extended body) in the Cartesian sense, but as human beings," I think his emphasis is wrong. The emphasis in the film is on the breakdown and reappraisal of that meaning, not on that meaning itself.


The author is not discounting the contextual relationship of the image emphasized by its relationship to other images by means of matchcuting, juxtaposition, shot composition, or intercutting
But the author doesn't address this as anything more than a tangential suggestion of Brakhage's failure to reach his goal. I think that's approaching the problem from the wrong direction.

[Pathétique]

I recently stumbled upon this examination of visual motifs in The Third Man. I think it's pretty good example of an effective analysis of a film's compositional techniques and their meanings.

http://www.rouge.com.au/rougerouge/third_man.html

[Amnesiac]

The Major Film Theories: An Introduction by J.D. Andrew

Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings by Leo Braudy

Any suggestions?

I have both of these, and they're quite good. The first takes a lot of prominent film theorists such as Arnheim, Munsterberg, Bazin, etc. and explains them in a pretty palatable way. The second is a compilation of articles written by a wide variety of authors (such as Christian Metz, Laura Mulvey, David Bordwell, etc).

Another great one you should look into if you want a good introduction is Theories of Cinema, 1945-1990 by Francesco Casetti as well as Film Theory by Robert Stam.

[B-side]

I've read up on Bresson's theories regarding acting and such and still am yet to truly grasp onto what it is that makes his films so unique other than feeling dead-on-arrival. People talk of his use of sound and close-ups of limbs and such as opposed to medium shots including the face. The latter strikes me as inconsequential at best, the former I don't really know. I've seen Balthazar and Pickpocket from him, neither of which I seem to be able to grasp what makes them so great. I guess my question is, what makes his films so unique? And how does this style of his elevate his films?

[Amnesiac]

By the way, has anyone here read Bordwell's Poetics of Cinema, yet? I've only checked out his Film History & Film Art books and I was looking to get into some of his more personal, subjective stuff. Poetics is supposed to be a pretty good anthology of the kind of research he's done over his career (or the last 30 years of it).

[B-side]

I've read up on Bresson's theories regarding acting and such and still am yet to truly grasp onto what it is that makes his films so unique other than feeling dead-on-arrival. People talk of his use of sound and close-ups of limbs and such as opposed to medium shots including the face. The latter strikes me as inconsequential at best, the former I don't really know. I've seen Balthazar and Pickpocket from him, neither of which I seem to be able to grasp what makes them so great. I guess my question is, what makes his films so unique? And how does this style of his elevate his films?

Nobody?

[Qrazy]

I've read up on Bresson's theories regarding acting and such and still am yet to truly grasp onto what it is that makes his films so unique other than feeling dead-on-arrival. People talk of his use of sound and close-ups of limbs and such as opposed to medium shots including the face. The latter strikes me as inconsequential at best, the former I don't really know. I've seen Balthazar and Pickpocket from him, neither of which I seem to be able to grasp what makes them so great. I guess my question is, what makes his films so unique? And how does this style of his elevate his films?

Well with the acting in theory the effect he's going for is to drain all of the 'artificial' drama from the scene... to turn the actors into statues/objects in the service of the story/theme/aesthetic delivery. His hypothesis is that the audience will fill the void left by the removal of the 'artificial' drama with their own emotions. This technique seems to work for some people and less for others. For me it only works with some of his films. His elliptical style of shooting pieces of the body and favoring movement/action over dialogue delivery was I believe fairly unique at the time. The elliptical editing elevates his material because it is a further break down of story and theme. For me the most helpful way to think of Bresson is as a minimalist. He's an artist who strives to pare out as much useless information as possible in order to tell his story/explore his theme. His elliptical edits help keep his work extremely concise and focused.

[BuffaloWilder]

I need to browse through some of the newer film texts - the most recent one on my shelf is from the late seventies.

[B-side]

Well with the acting in theory the effect he's going for is to drain all of the 'artificial' drama from the scene... to turn the actors into statues/objects in the service of the story/theme/aesthetic delivery. His hypothesis is that the audience will fill the void left by the removal of the 'artificial' drama with their own emotions. This technique seems to work for some people and less for others. For me it only works with some of his films. His elliptical style of shooting pieces of the body and favoring movement/action over dialogue delivery was I believe fairly unique at the time. The elliptical editing elevates his material because it is a further break down of story and theme. For me the most helpful way to think of Bresson is as a minimalist. He's an artist who strives to pare out as much useless information as possible in order to tell his story/explore his theme. His elliptical edits help keep his work extremely concise and focused.

The approach is an interesting one, I'll give him that. Very interesting in theory. We'll see what a new approach brings me next time I see a Bresson.